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1. Introduction
Recent advances in the virtualisation area have
made clouds a prominent solution for outsourc-
ing information systems. Some of the key char-
acteristics of cloud infrastructures include scal-
ability, multitenancy and resource sharing. Ten-
ants can create, destroy or reconfigure virtual re-
sources with unprecedented ease. However, the
same characteristics that make cloud environ-
ments agile and dynamic, also affect the ability of
a security monitoring framework to successfully
detect attacks [2] and sometimes introduce new
security vulnerabilities that originate from both
inside and outside the infrastructure. Traditional
security monitoring solutions are not designed to
automatically cope with reconfigurations of the
virtual environment, and the potentially high rate
of such reconfigurations makes it impossible for a
security administrator to reconfigure the security
monitoring setup accordingly. This requirement
can potentially lead to misalignment between
cloud administration and security administration
workflows and ultimately to incomplete detection
of threats. Moreover large scale security moni-
toring frameworks include various components
(firewalls, IDSs, log collectors etc.) that perform
different functionalities and are located in differ-
ent areas or even outside the virtual infrastructure.
For theses reasons, a successful cloud-tailored se-
curity monitoring infrastructure should be able to
adapt its components based on changes in the in-
frastructure with little to no manual input.
1.1 Related Work
Providing a security monitoring framework for
cloud environments has been the focus of sev-
eral research projects. Some of them utilise vir-
tual machine introspection techniques in order to
gain a comprehensive and deep view of the moni-
tored system [3][4]. However, these solutions of-
ten focus on intrusion detection in one particular
virtual machine and are not able to adapt based on
occuring changes.
In [1] Roschke et al. suggest to deploy intru-
sion detection sensors in various layers of the
cloud model, those intrusion detection sensors be-
ing controlled by a central unit. The proposed so-
lution is intrusive as it entails deployment of sen-
sors inside client VMs.
VESPA [5], a self protecting monitoring archi-
tecture for IaaS clouds, addresses self adaptation
but does not take into account multi-tenancy and
per-tenant specific security requirements.
2. Thesis goal
Our goal throughout the duration of this thesis is
to design and implement a self-adaptable secu-
rity monitoring framework that is able to detect
infrastructure related changes and automatically
reconfigure its components accordingly. We have
identified six major properties that our framework
should comply to:
• Self adaptation: system components should
be able to reconfigure themselves based on
changes that occur in the cloud environment.
The changes can be initiated either by the
provider or the tenants. We identify three ma-
jor change categories: hardware infrastructure
related (i.e server addition or removal), vir-
tual infrastructure related (VM creation, dele-
tion, migration) and traffic related (fluctuation
in the load of monitored traffic). The system
should feature dedicated probes for detecting
these high occurrence phenomena. Security re-
lated events such as detection of a DoS attack
should also trigger reconfiguration of the in-
volved components.
• Scalability: the system should instantiate new
monitoring sensors in order to cope with vari-
ations in the volume of monitored traffic and
addition of new servers both at physical and
virtual level.
• Customisation: the tenants should be allowed
to customise the framework or parts of it for
detecting specific attacks depending on the
type of deployed services. The specific secu-
rity requirements should be expressed in the
Service Level Agreement.
• Isolation: the system should guarantee iso-
lation of monitoring traffic for each tenant.
Security components could share physical
resources but separate per tenant instances
should be deployed.
• Cost minimisation: a successful solution should
achieve a high detection quality while main-
taining the financial cost for both tenants and
the provider at a minimal level. In order to
achieve this objective the system should allow
component sharing between tenants.
• Security: the system should address the afore-
mentioned properties in a way that does not
introduce novel security threats. The reconfig-
uration of security components or the instanti-
ation of new ones, actions that are required in
order to address self adaptation and scalabil-
ity, should occur is such frequency that guar-
antees that they remain operational. Customi-
sation of rules should guarantee that the newly
applied ruleset does not exceed the capacity of
the component dedicated to each tenant. Com-
ponent sharing should maintain the same de-
tection quality while achieving lower costs.
2.1 Threat model
We consider software attacks that originate both
from virtual machines and outside the cloud in-
frastructure. Our system targets both service level
(i.e SQL injection) and system level (directed to-
wards the virtual or physical infrastructure) at-
tacks.
3. Current status
In this context we have designed SAIDS, a self-
adaptable intrusion detection framework that ad-
dresses the afore-mentioned objectives. As de-
picted in Figure 1 SAIDS consists of three major
components that are run by the cloud administra-
tor: the local Intrusion Detection Sensors (lIDS),
the Infrastructure Monitoring Probes (IMP) and
the Adaptation Manager (AM). The lIDSs are re-
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Figure 1. The SAIDS architecture
sponsible for analysing network packets that flow
through subsets of virtual switches using a sig-
nature based technique. We utilise containers for
creating a separate lIDS instance per tenant in
order to guarantee isolation. Alert correlation is
out of the scope of this thesis. The IMPs are lo-
cated inside the cloud controller and are responsi-
ble for detecting topology changes (for instance a
vm migration) in the virtual infrastructure and re-
lating all necessary information (identifier and IP
of the VM that participates in the change, host-
name of the physical host of the VM) to the AM.
Finally the AM handles the reconfiguration of
the lIDSs upon receiving a notification from the
IMP. The AM relates the incoming information
to a list of services running in the VM and se-
lects the set of additional rules than need to be
activated in the lIDS responsible for the virtual
switch at the VM’s new location. This set of ad-
ditional rules also include rules that address a ten-
ant’s specific security requirements as stated in
the Service Level Agreement. The AM also de-
cides whether to deploy a new lIDS depending on
the traffic load. The communication between the
AM and the lIDSs is handled through a secure
channel.
We have conducted an early qualitative evalu-
ation of SAIDS based on a scenario that mani-
fests the need for adaptation. In our scenario we
demonstrate the security gap introduced when a
migration of a VM occurs and how we handle it
by adapting the lIDS responsible for monitoring
the traffic in the new location of the VM. The
overall migration time with the adaptation pro-
cess is 4s while without adaptation it takes 2.1s.
Although the adaptation process is executed in
parallel with the migration, we observe that re-
configuring an lIDS is increasing significantly the
overall time.
4. Future Work
In the future we plan to combine the security
monitoring of tenants and provider infrastructure
in order to achieve cost minimization. Next steps
include giving partial control of the monitoring
framework to tenants and expanding our architec-
ture by including other types of devices such as
log collectors, firewalls and aggregators. We also
intend to address scalability issues.
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